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TRAGEDIES IN SOMALIA, YUGOSLAVIA,
HAITI, RWANDA AND LIBERIA- REVISITING
THE VALIDITY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW- PART II
VED P. NANDA,* THOMAS F. MUTHER, JR.** AND AMY E.
ECKERT***
I. INTRODUCTION
In part I of this article,' Professor Ved Nanda presented a frame-
work for determining the validity of unilateral humanitarian interven-
tion under international law. The framework was based on an analysis
of selected cases of humanitarian intervention that occurred during the
Cold War. To fall within this category, the intervention had to be an
assertion of a state's right to protect its "own nationals or a third state's
nationals in another state, or even the nationals of the state against
which coercive measures were undertaken."2 Although a historical
analysis of this doctrine was undertaken, the selected cases (the United
States' 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1983 intervention
in Grenada, and 1989 intervention in Panama; India's 1972 interven-
tion in East Pakistan; Tanzania's 1979 intervention in Uganda; and
Vietnam's 1978 intervention in Cambodia) all occurred in the post-
United Nations Charter period.
Based on these case studies, five criteria for evaluating humani-
tarian intervention were enumerated: (1) the necessity criterion,
whether there was genocide or gross, persistent, and systematic viola-
tions of basic human rights; (2) the proportionality criterion, the dura-
tion and propriety of the force applied; (3) the purpose criterion,
whether the intervention was motivated by humanitarian considera-
tion, self-interest, or mixed motivations; (4) whether the action was
collective or unilateral; and (5) whether the intervention maximized the
* Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law at the University of Denver, College of Law.
** J.D. graduate of the University of Denver, College of Law, 1996.
J.D. graduate of the University of Denver, College of Law, 1997.
1. Ved Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti- Revisiting
the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law - Part 1, 20 DENy. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 305 (1992).
2. Id. at 309.
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best outcome. 3 These criteria were then applied to determine the va-
lidity of United Nations ("U.N.") intervention in Iraq to protect the
Kurds in North Iraq and the Shiites in the South. However, since the
publication of Part I of this article, several additional interventions on
humanitarian grounds have occurred. For the most part, these inter-
ventions were undertaken collectively by multinational forces, under
the auspices of the U.N. or other regional arrangements. In the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international security organization, NATO, led
the intervention.
For the current study, we have selected the following five cases:
Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Liberia. Our purpose is to explore
the current trends of humanitarian intervention and to make some ten-
tative observations on its future direction. We will, however, begin with
a few preliminary remarks highlighting the pertinent geopolitical
changes in the recent past which have a significant bearing on how the
doctrine is perceived and shaped.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by hopeful signs that the
dream of collective security for the maintenance of international peace
and security would perhaps become a reality. To repel the Iraqi aggres-
sion against Kuwait, an effective marshaling of forces drawn from sev-
eral countries occurred pursuant to the Security Council ("Council")
mandate that Member States "use all necessary means ... to restore
international peace and security in the area."4 This effort reflected the
ability of the Security Council's permanent members to work together
as never before and created widespread hope that the U.N. would, at
last, function as the framers intended.
5
Subsequently, in January 1992, a Council summit took place with a
request to the Secretary-General to submit a report on the U.N.'s
peacekeeping activities.6 A few months later, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
then Secretary-General, complied with the request and submitted An
Agenda for Peace,7 a blueprint for future U.N. action. An ambitious vi-
sion of the U.N.'s role in the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity, this vision included four types of activities: preventive diplomacy
before disputes escalate; peacemaking under Chapter VII when hostile
parties have not yet reached an agreement; peace-keeping; and post-
conflict peace-building.8 The Secretary-General emphasized the pros-
3. Id. at 330.
4. S.C. Res. 678, April 5, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S/678].
5. James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a
Community of Power, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9, 28 (1991).
6. Statement by the President of the Council in the section entitled "Peacemaking
and peace-keeping," U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992).
7. U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111, June 17, 1992
8. Id. para. 20.
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pects for the U.N.'s ability to maintain peace in the post-Cold War
world and characterized the new spirit of cooperation in the Security
Council as a "second chance to create the world of our Charter."9 Ini-
tially, the permanent members of the Security Council shared this en-
thusiasm, which they expressed by creating an unprecedented number
of new operations. To illustrate, while there were just thirteen
peacekeeping operations from the U.N.'s inception to 1985, they jumped
to thirty by the end of 1994.10
The prospects for a more effective U.N. role in the maintenance of
the international order were, however, short-lived. The Gulf War be-
came at best a distant memory after severe setbacks to U.N.
peacekeeping efforts in Somalia;1" a display of sheer helplessness by
U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia; 12 a withdrawal of the U.N. peacekeeping
force from Rwanda, which led to disastrous results in that country-in-
cluding genocidal acts, hundreds of thousands of deaths and casualties,
and a million refugees and displaced persons; 13 and an ineffective U.N.
partnership with the intervening forces of the Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian civil war.14
Meanwhile, the United Nations came under heavy attack in the
U.S. Congress on charges that it suffered from cumbersome bureau-
cratic bungling and wasteful duplications and redundancies. 15 The out-
come was that the U.N. had its share of financial woes, causing the or-
ganization nearly to go bankrupt. 6 Moreover, there was no enthusiasm
9. Id. para. 75.
10. See VICTORIA K. HOLT, BRIEFING BOOK ON PEACEKEEPING-THE U.S. ROLE IN
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 1-4 (2d ed. 1995).
11. See generally Jarat Chopra, Achilles' Heel in Somalia: Learning from a Concep-
tual Failure, 31 TEX INT'L L.J. 495 (1996) [hereinafter Chopra].
12. Roger Cohen, U.N. Mission in Bosnia: A Painful Lesson in Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1995, at A10.
13. The United Nations had difficulties establishing a peacekeeping force in the wake
of the Rwandan violence. See Paul Lewis, Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for
Not Saving Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at Al. Once established, the peacekeep-
ing force failed to provide security against human rights violations. See Donatella Lorch,
U.N.-Rwanda Ties Sour as Mandate Nears End, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A8; Bar-
bara Crossette, Send the Peacekeepers Home, a Ravaged Rwanda Tells U.N., N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1995, at A9.
14. See section III(E) infra and Clement T. Adibe, The Liberian Conflict and the
ECOWAS-U.N. Partnership, 18 THIRD WORLD Q. 471 (1997). Adibe alleges that the U.N.'s
effort in Liberia was "indifferent and purposeless" and that many Liberians were not even
aware of the U.N.'s presence there. Id. at 485.
15. Several outspoken members of the U.S. Congress criticized the United Nations as
bloated and ineffective. Such sentiments, coupled with a perception that he opposed re-
form, motivated the American opposition to Boutros Boutros-Ghali's serving a second
term as Secretary-General. See John M. Goshko, U.S. Sides against Second Term for
U.N. Chief in Informal Vote, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1996, at A13. Dissatisfaction with the
management of the United Nations also underlies Congressional objections to paying the
U.S.' debt to the United Nations. See Plan to Fund U.N. Draws Helms'Fire, WASH. POST,
Jan. 30, 1997, at A6.
16. Barbara Crossette, U.N. Juggles Funds to Stay Afloat, Expert Says, N.Y. TIMES,
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among major players at the United Nations for building the organiza-
tion's capacity to enable it to effectively discharge its primary function
of maintaining international peace and security. The Secretary-
General's plea for the U.N. to have a rapid deployment force and for
sound financing came to naught.
A major outcome of the end of the Cold War and especially the rap-
prochement between the U.S. and Russia was the closing of the chapter
on superpower intervention and proxy wars on ideological grounds. The
U.S. would now define its national interest quite narrowly, retreating
from its earlier preference for assertive multilateralism as the focus of
its foreign policy. The change in policy was articulated in May 1994 in
Presidential Decision Directive ("PDD") 2517 enunciating the criteria by
which President Clinton's administration would determine whether or
not to support U.N. sponsored peacekeeping operations. Henceforth the
criterion for U.S. action or support would be the extent to which U.S.
interests would be advanced. Among other factors were the severity of
the threat to international peace and security, including the gross viola-
tion of human rights, the clarity of objectives, the capacity to accom-
plish those objectives, the consequence of inaction, and the anticipated
duration of the mission.18
In light of these developments, it remains doubtful whether collec-
tive intervention could be realistically expected to occur even in the face
of egregious violations of human rights, if the major powers in the U.N.,
especially those with veto power in the Security Council, did not find it
in their national interest to authorize the use of force for such interven-
tion. Rwanda is a case in point, as are Burundi and Liberia. As a re-
sult, in order to prevent and deter further transgressions against hu-
manity, there must be room for unilateral intervention on
humanitarian grounds.
Sept. 13, 1995, at A8.
17. White House Press Release, The Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations, undated.
18. For a thoughtful analysis of PDD 25, see generally Glenn T. Ware, The Emerging
Norm of Humanitarian Intervention and Presidential Decision Directive 25, 44 NAVAL L.
REV. 1 (1997).
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Somalia gained its independence in 1960 from colonial powers Brit-
ain and Italy.20 For nine years immediately following independence,
Somalia enjoyed a stable democratic government. 21 However, in 1969,
allegations of fraud by the elected government prompted Major General
Mohamed Siad Barre to seize power through a military coup.22 By ma-
nipulating Somalis' clan loyalties, repressing opposition groups, and
corruption, Barre maintained his grip on Somalia for over two dec-
ades.
23
Because of Somalia's strategic location near the Gulf of Aden, both
superpowers sought Somalia's allegiance during the Cold War by pro-
viding Barre with foreign aid. 24 Playing Somalia's strategic geographi-
cal position to his advantage, Barre courted the U.S. and the Soviet
Union alternately. 25 After coming to power in 1969, Barre declared his
government to be Marxist in order to receive foreign aid from the Soviet
Union.26 In 1977, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Ethiopia, So-
malia's historical rival. 27 Consequently, Barre sought and received for-
eign aid from the U.S..28
By the mid-1980s, the U.S. started decreasing its aid to Somalia,
which fell from $34 million in 1984 to $8.7 million by 1987, a 75 percent
19. See generally JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION
RESTORE HOPE (1995); I.M. LEWIS, A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA: NATION AND STATE
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (1980); D.D. LAITIN & S.S. SAMATAR, SOMALIA: NATION IN SEARCH
OF A STATE (1987); TERRENCE LYONS & AHMED I. SAMATAR, SOMALIA: STATE COLLAPSE,
MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION, AND STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (1995);
M.S. OMAR, THE ROAD TO ZERO: SOMALIA'S SELF-DESTRUCTION (1992); A.I. Samatar, De-
struction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention, 30 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 625 (1992).
20. Modern Somalia existed as two separate colonies, Italian Somaliland and British
Somaliland. These two colonies merged into Somalia upon independence in 1960. S.S.
SAMATAR, HISTORICAL SETTING, IN SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 3 (Helen Chapin Metz
ed., 1993)[hereinafter SAMATAR].
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. at 36-37.
23. SAMUEL M. MAKINDA, SEEKING PEACE FROM CHAOS: HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA 17 (1993)[hereinafter MAKINDA].
24. Keith B. Richburg, Orphan of the Cold War: Somalia Lost its Key Role, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 1992, at A24 [hereinafter Richburg].
25. Id.
26. SAMATAR, supra note 20, at 42.
27. Richburg, supra note 24.
28. Id.
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decline in just three years.29 By 1988, the U.S. and the European
Community, except for Italy, had virtually abandoned Somalia. 30 After
the end of the Cold War, Somalia's strategic position ceased to have
value, and the international community's interest in the country di-
minished still further.31 This undermined Barre's political position
within his own country. Inter-clan rivalries, corruption within Barre's
government, and weariness of political repression erupted into full-
fledged civil war. Even before the final collapse of Barre's government
in January 1991, the Somali state had ceased to fulfill its institutional,
political, and economic functions. 32 After the final defeat of Barre, the
United Somali Congress ("USC") appointed Ali Mahdi Mohamed as So-
malia's interim president. 33
The USC draws its support from Somalia's largest clan, the
Hawiye. However, Mohamed Ali Mahdi faced opposition from General
Mohamed Farah Aideed, a member of a different Hawiye sub-clan. 34
During the course of their struggle for control, the factions supporting
Ali Mahdi and Aideed destroyed most of Mogadishu. 35 The ongoing civil
war between the USC factions, along with the presence of violent armed
gangs in the country, resulted in the collapse of an effective government
in Somalia. The situation was further exacerbated by a severe drought,
which exacted a terrible toll on Somalia-approximately 300,000 per-
sons perished. 36 These conditions captured the world's attention and
prompted a response from the international community.
2. The Intervention
The United Nations first addressed the situation in Somalia in
January, 1992. Recognizing the gravity of conditions within Somalia
and terming them a threat to international peace and security, the Se-
curity Council imposed a complete arms embargo on Somalia and called
for increased humanitarian aid. 37 Beyond this marginal commitment to
ending the military strife and resulting widespread famine, this resolu-
tion did little more than espouse commonplace rhetoric with no clear
hopes of bringing about an end to the crisis.
Three months later, after a cease-fire agreement was signed by the
29. SAMATAR, supra note 20, at 46.
30. MAKINDA, supra note 23, at 56.
31. Id. at 89.
32. ROBERT G. PATMAN, THE U.N. OPERATION IN SOMALIA, IN A CRISIS OF
EXPECTATIONS: U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990's 87 (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A.
Thayer eds., 1995)[hereinafter PATMAN].
33. MAKINDA, supra note 23, at 31.
34. Id. at 31.
35. Keith B. Richburg, Aideed Warlord in a Famished Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 8
1992, at Al.
36. PATMAN, supra note 32, at 85.
37. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992).
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warring parties in early March 1992, the Security Council acted again
by adopting Resolution 746. 38 In addition to calling on the combatants
within Somalia to cease their activities, Resolution 746 accepted the
U.N. Secretary-General's recommendation that a technical team be sent
to Somalia with the goal of observing the administration of humanitar-
ian aid and brokering a peace agreement between the parties. 39 The
team was to report back to the Security Council. However, the inade-
quacy of these measures soon became apparent, the situation continued
to deteriorate, and the Security Council was forced to take additional
measures. Thus it adopted Resolution 751,40 which foreshadowed the
formation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia ("UNOSOM").
The resolution authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a special
representative for Somalia, deployed fifty troops to monitor the cease-
fire, and "in principle" established a security force "to be deployed as
soon as possible."41 In August 1992, the Security Council acted again in
light of further deteriorating conditions in Somalia, authorizing an air-
lift of humanitarian aid through Resolution 775.42 This resolution
seemed to reflect the Security Council's view that UNOSOM had en-
joyed some success and that the deployment of additional U.N. forces
would perhaps suffice to bring peace to the region.
43
Months later, nearly one year after its original recognition of the
human rights abuses in Somalia, the Security Council acknowledged
the ineffectiveness of the embargo and the previous deployment of
forces. In Resolution 794, the Security Council determined that the
conflict in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and secu-
rity,44 and endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General that
action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should
be taken in order to establish a more secure environment for humani-
38. S.C. Res. 746, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3060th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES746 (1992).
39. Id. See also Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th
mtg., at 16, U.N. Doec. S/23963 (1992). This approach was tenable, given the U.N.'s suc-
cess in negotiating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, ending the eight year
war between Iran and Iraq in 1988, and South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia in 1989.
40. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992).
41. On July 27, 1992, Security Council Resolution 767 acknowledged the arrival of
the fifty observers. S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3101st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S1RES/767 (1992). It is also noteworthy that Resolution 751 established a committee to
monitor the arms embargo, a seemingly moot initiative considering the embargo's incon-
sequential effect on the human rights situation in Somalia to that point. See Rajendra
Ramlogan, Towards a New Vision of World Security: The United Nations Security Council
and Lessons of Somalia, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 213, 235 (1993).
42. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3110th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (1992);
see also Security Council Approves More Troops to Somalia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Aug. 29, 1992, Lexis, Nexis Library, AFP File, at 2. This action was taken on the Secre-
tary-General's recommendation. The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/24480 & Add. 1 (1992).
43. See Ramlogan, supra note 41.
44. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doec. S/RES/794
(1992).
833
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tarian relief operations in Somalia. 45 This resolution could be consid-
ered a watershed because it marked the first time that the Security
Council invoked its Chapter VII powers and acted under Article 42 on
humanitarian grounds.
46
To illustrate, Resolution 794 broke new ground in two significant
ways. First, in light of the internal turmoil and the lack of a function-
ing government, the Council was forced to intervene without the con-
sent of the government. 47 Second, Resolution 794 seemed to extend the
scope of Chapter VII to include human rights abuses, for in invoking its
Chapter VII powers, the Security Council stated that "the magnitude of
human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia... constitutes a
threat to international peace and security."48 This aggregation of gross
violations of human rights within the borders of a country with a threat
to international peace and security expanded the scope of Chapter VII
action considerably.
Just as the decision to use force in Somalia broke new legal ground,
the implementation also featured a new model of collective humanitar-
ian intervention which could become possible only after the end of the
Cold War. While the early stages of U.N.-led intervention were success-
ful in providing food and medical care to those in need, the U.N. lacked
the necessary resources and political will to create another U.N. force.
Thus, Resolution 794 empowered a U.S.-led coalition, the Unified Task
Force ("UNITAF"), to use "all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia."49
Before opting for the U.S.-led coalition, the Council, however, con-
sidered five options to address the Somali crisis, as outlined by Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in his letter to the Council. 50 Two of these options envi-
sioned direct U.N. intervention. 51 But, as noted earlier, the U.N. lacked
the necessary resources, the logistical and contingency planning infra-
structure, and the organizational capability to undertake an operation
of this magnitude by itself. Moreover, the U.S. had offered to lead a
45. Letter Dated 29 Nov. 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992) [hereinafter
Secretary-General's Letter].
46. The Security Council adopted Resolution 794 as it was concerned with the starva-
tion of civilians in Somalia, finding that a threat to international peace and security ex-
isted because of the "magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia,
further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian
assistance." Id.
47. Paul Lewis, Key U.N. Members Agree to U.S. Force in Somalia Mission, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3 1992, at Al.
48. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 44, at 1.
49. Michael Wines, US. Launches Somalia Aid Mission, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 5 1992,
at Al. It seems likely that without the U.S.'s offer, the U.N. may never have committed to
a full peace force in the region. Ramlogan, supra note 41 at 237.
50. Secretary-General's Letter, supra note 45.
51. Id.
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military force for delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia.
5 2
UNITAF, established to end the humanitarian suffering in Soma-
lia, consisted of 37,000 military personnel, 28,000 of whom came from
the U.S.53 This new operation enjoyed more success than its predeces-
sor, and the parties agreed to a cease-fire on January 8, 1993, which
permitted the full implementation of the U.N.'s 100-Day Action Pro-
gram.5 4 There was an increased U.N. and non-governmental organiza-
tion ("NGO") presence in Somalia. The Addis-Ababa agreements of
January 8-15 that year committed Somali clan leaders to cooperate in
the creation of a cease-fire monitoring group and the collection and de-
struction of weapons.
With its limited resources and personnel, the U.N. would not have
achieved these results without the help of the U.S.. However, the
U.N.'s decision to defer control of UNITAF to the U.S. also entailed
some costs. The U.S., having achieved the immediate goal of restoring
some peace and stability, was unwilling to remain in an increasingly
hostile environment longer than necessary.55 By contrast, the Secre-
tary-General clearly wished for the U.S.-led UNITAF to remain in place
longer, stating that "[i]t would be a tragedy if the premature depar-
ture ... of the Unified Task Force were to plunge Somalia back into an-
archy and starvation."
5 6
On March 26, 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
814, which established the United Nations Operation in Somalia
("UNOSOM I") in hopes of promoting a prompt, smooth, and phased
transition from the Unified Task Force to a U.N.-led intervention.
57
52. Id. For a discussion of these options, see Mark R. Hutchinson, Recent Develop-
ment - Restoring Hope: U.N. Security Council Resolutions for Somalia and an Expanded
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 624, 629-32 (1993).
53. By comparison, UNOSOM consisted of only 500 personnel. In his December 8,
1992 address, the Secretary-General stated that Operation Restore Hope's goals were "to
feed the starving, protect the defenseless, and prepare the way for political, economic, and
social reconstruction." Statement of the Secretary-general to the People of Somalia on
United Nations Action on Security, Humanitarian Relief, and Political Reconciliation in
Somalia, U.N. Press Release SG/SM14874, December 8, 1992.
54. See 100-Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance for So-
malia, October 6, 1992, which called for, among other things, massive infusion of food aid,
provision of basic health services, urgent provision of clean water, delivery of shelter ma-
terials, and prevention of future refugee outflows.
55. Keith Richburg, Top U.N. Officer in Somalia says Tactics were Apt, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23 1993, at A12. In areas controlled by UNITAF, food and medical supplies resumed
movement and agricultural workers once again began production. Robert Oakley, Mis-
sion Accomplished in Somalia, WASH. POST, Mar. 21 1993, at C7.
56. Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs
18 and 19 of Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/25354 and add. 1 & 2 (1993) (proposing that UNITAF extend its operations to the whole
of Somalia and disarm the factions before handing over operational responsibility to a
new U.N. peacekeeping operation.). See also U.N. Doc. S/24992, Dec. 19, 1992.
57. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/814
(1993).
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Taking into consideration UNITAF's limited success in creating a stable
peace in Somalia, the Security Council again acted under Chapter VII
and expanded UNOSOM II's size and mission. The Security Council
gave UNOSOM II responsibility for consolidating, expanding, and
maintaining a secure environment throughout all of Somalia, with a
special eye to disarmament and demanding that the Somali parties
abide by the Addis Ababa agreements of January 1993.58 This included
such nation-building efforts by the U.N. as the establishment of re-
gional councils and a police force. Given UNOSOM II's mandate, it is
appropriate to conclude that, while it typified a traditional peacekeep-
ing mission, UNOSOM II was conceived as a peace enforcement mis-
sion.
59
In response to an attack on Pakistani troops serving as part of
UNOSOM II, in which over 20 soldiers were killed and over 50
wounded, the Security Council passed Resolution 837.60 The Resolution
reiterated the Secretary-General's prior authorization under Resolution
814 to take all necessary measures including investigation, arrest, de-
tention, and prosecution of all those responsible. The U.N. action en-
tailed, inter alia, attacks upon Aideed's headquarters. 6 1 Several civilian
casualties occurred and efforts were taken to find and prosecute Aideed.
These actions, however, alienated segments of the local population.
62
Subsequently, the U.S. withdrew its forces, several European countries
followed suit, and eventually in January 1995, UNOSOM II troops, con-
ceding the failure of the mission, began withdrawing. By early March,
all UNOSOM II forces had departed from Somalia. 6
3
58. Id.
59. See Kenneth Freed, Somali Civil War is Over, Rivals Vow Peace, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1992, at Al; John M. Goshko, U.N. Chief Favors Use of Force in Somalia: Plan Offers
Radical Change from Group's History of Passive Peace Keeping, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1992,
at Al; Robert Greenberger, Troop Strength: Outspoken U.N. Chief Takes Strong Role, Irk-
ing Some Nations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1992, at Al.
60. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 1-3 , U.N. Doc. S/Res./837
(1993).
61. See Donatella Lorch, U.N. Says Attack Dealt Heavy Blow to Somali Faction, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1993, at Al; Keith B. Richburg, U.S. Planes Hit Mogadishu Again, WASH.
POST, June 13, 1993, at Al.
62. See Donatella Lorch, Aidid's Forces Still Strong, U.N. Aides in Somalia Say, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1993, at A6; Keith B. Richburg, Somali Mob Kills Three Journals, Melee
Follows Raid on Militia Forces, WASH. POST, July 13, 1993, at Al.
63. See Donatella Lorch, As U.N. Girds to Leave Somalia, Renewed Fighting, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at A3; Donatella Lorch, Marines Cover U.N.'s Pullout from Somalia,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at Al; Farewell to Africa, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 28, 1995,
at 19. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, Submitted in
Pursuance of Paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 954 (1994), U.N. SCOR, U.N.
Doc. S/1995/231 (1995); Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1996/42 (1996).
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3. Appraisal
The United Nations intervention in Somalia extended the scope of
Chapter VII to include violations of human rights. The intervention be-
gan with the objective of providing humanitarian assistance. Subse-
quently, its focus was shifted to follow the traditional role of U.N.
peacekeeping missions of seeking reconciliation among the warring fac-
tions, and still later to undertaking enforcement action. The U.N. mis-
sion failed in Somalia primarily because it lacked a coherent policy to
identify its objectives and to marshal adequate resources to accomplish
those objectives. To illustrate, the task of building or rebuilding insti-
tutions in Somalia with the goal of political reconstruction and nation
building that the U.N. undertook through resolution 794 required the
investment of considerable political capital, resources and know-how,
and skillful operation in the effort to bring about Somalia's political
transformation. Also, the U.N. mandate to disarm the warring factions
and to take enforcement action under Chapter VII resulted in heavy re-
liance on armed forces and a disproportionate emphasis on a military
approach to address the crisis. The U.N. found itself wanting on both
accounts as it sought to meet these goals.
64
B. Former Yugoslavia
The U.N. intervention in the former Yugoslavia is by far the best
known, and perhaps least understood, of all U.N. actions since the end
of the Cold War. The huge toll in human life and property damage cap-
tured the attention of the world. 65 In addition, the U.N. operation that
responded to this crisis was the largest to date. 66 Despite its high visi-
bility, the complexities of the dispute made it difficult to understand,
especially because the conflict involved numerous ethnic, linguistic, and
religious factors, and because the positions of the parties changed from
time to time.
1. The Conflict
Beginning after World War II and until its eventual collapse, Yugo-
64. For an incisive analysis of the failure of the U.N. mission, see generally Chopra,
supra note 11.
65. The estimated death toll for 1995 ranges from 167,000 (Bosnian Institute of Pub-
lic Health) to 250,000 (Country Reports on Human Rights).
66. U.N. involvement in the former Yugoslavia was authorized by several Security
Council resolutions and consisted of 44,000 military and civilian personnel. Nearly $4
billion was assessed to U.N. Member States. Peace Operations- Update on the Situation
in the Former Yugoslavia, GAO Report, May 9, 1995, at 3. For incisive accounts of the
conflict and the intervention, see generally SUSAN WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS
AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (1995); SUSAN WOODWARD, IMPLEMENTING
PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A POsT-DAYTON PRIMER AND MEMORANDUM OF
WARNING (1996).
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slavia provided a system of peaceful compromise for the many nation-
alities within its borders, in spite of the conflicting, multifaceted, and
perennial national questions they posed.6 7 Yugoslavia's creation in
1918 marked the first occasion of Serbs and Croats living together in
the same state,68 and the interdependence of these two largest ethnic
groups in the country helped to maintain the stability of the Yugoslav
system.69 Still, Yugoslavia never succeeded in constituting itself as a
political community, and was always forced to compete with its subsidi-
ary national communities and their desires for statehood.
7 0
The death of Tito in May 1980, after thirty-seven years of rule,
marked the beginning of the end of the Yugoslav state. With Tito's
death, the political center in Yugoslavia weakened, and new pressures
for change began to surface. 71 Serbian nationalism would come to play
a significant role in Yugoslavia's eventual disintegration and the ensu-
ing war. In 1984, the League of Communists of Serbia introduced the
first comprehensive reform package since Tito's death.7 2 Key among its
provisions was the rolling back of the provinces' autonomy within Ser-
bia. 7
3
In 1987, the triumph of conservative factions in the League of
Communists of Serbia and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic bolstered a
nascent nationalist movement.7 4 Milosevic introduced measures calcu-
lated to increase Serbian national pride, such as increasing use of the
Cyrillic alphabet, and adopting a new, militant national anthem that
had been banned during Tito's lifetime.75 The leaders of this movement
sought to arouse nationalist fervor by portraying Serbs as persecuted
within the Yugoslav state and threatened in the wake of its collapse.
7 6
This enmity of other Yugoslav peoples formed the bedrock of the Ser-
bian national identity.7 7 Serbian leaders used extreme measures to
mobilize Serbian diaspora in support of Serb nationalism, including
rumors of planned genocidal attacks against Serbs living in other re-
publics.7 8
Open conflict erupted in the former Yugoslavia in June 1991, when
67. VESNA PESIC, SERBIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS 1
(1996)[hereinafter PESIC].
68. SABRINA PETRA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL 1 (1996) [hereinafter RAMET].
69. PESIC, supra note 67, at 1. Historically, Croatia favored greater autonomy from
Yugoslavia, while Serbia supported greater centralism. These antagonistic positions ex-
hibited during Yugoslavia's existence help to explain the course of the post-Yugoslavia
conflicts. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 5.
71. RAMET, supra note 68, at 7.
72. Id. at 14.
73. Id.
74. PESIC, supra note 67, at 14.
75. RAMET, supra note 68, at 26.
76. PESIC, supra note 67, at 14.
77. Id.
78 ld. at 21.
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two former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared their in-
dependence. 79 The dominant Serbian republic, with the weight of the
Yugoslav National Army behind it, joined with the ethnic Serbs living
in Croatia who opposed Croatian independence.8 0 The U.N. responded
by imposing an arms embargo on all of Yugoslavia's successor states81
and by sending an envoy to help mediate an end to the fighting. The
U.N.'s special envoy, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was able to
broker an end to this initial conflict, and the parties agreed to an un-
conditional cease-fire in November 1991.82 In January 1992, the U.N.
Security Council sent a small contingent of fifty troops to Yugoslavia for
the purpose of overseeing the fragile cease-fire.8 3 One month later, the
Council increased the size of this force by twenty-five.8 4 Finally, in Feb-
ruary 1992, after it was satisfied that the major obstacles to the estab-
lishment of a peacekeeping force had been removed, the Security Coun-
cil established the United Nations Protection Force ("UNPROFOR")
through Resolution 743.85
By July 1992, the situation in Croatia seemed relatively secure,
and the U.N.'s attention turned to the newly-created Bosnian Republic.
The hostilities between Bosnia and Serbia developed independently of
those between Serbia and Croatia. While Yugoslavia existed as a state,
both Serbs and Croats inhabited Bosnia-Herzegovina, and both the
Serbian and Croatian republics had historical claims to the region.8 6 As
early as November 12, 1991, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic
warned of the inevitability of war and requested the immediate dis-
patch of U.N. peacekeeping forces.8 7 After the Bosnian Serbs pro-
claimed the existence of the Bosnian Serb Republic on December 20,
1991, President Izetbegovic made another futile appeal for the deploy-
ment of a peacekeeping force along the Bosnian border.88 On March 3,
1992, the Izetbegovic government declared the independence of Bosnia
after a referendum.8 9 Within a month, conflict broke out between Bos-
79. For a detailed account of the history leading up to the decision to declare inde-
pendence, see RAMET, supra note 68.
80. Slovenia was mostly spared from direct military confrontation because only a
small number of ethnic Serbs lived in Slovenia.
81. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).
82. S/RES/721 (1991), adopted by the Security Council at its 3018th meeting, on 27
November 1991.
83. S/RES1727 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3028th meeting, on 8
January 1992.
84. S/RES/740 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3049th meeting, on 7
February 1992.
85. S/RES/743 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3055th meeting, on 21
February 1992.
86. See PESIC, supra note 67, at 2.
87. The Security Council received this warning coldly, stating in its Resolution 724
(S/RES/724) that the situation in the former Yugoslavia had not escalated to a level war-
ranting a U.N. peacekeeping force.
88. RAMET, supra note 68, at 245.
89. Id. at 246.
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nian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. Because the Serbs enjoyed the sup-
port of the Yugoslav Army, 90 by the end of 1992 they controlled seventy
percent of Bosnian territory.9 1
Meanwhile, Bosnian Croats were working to consolidate their hold
on the western part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 92 Although the Croats had
initially supported the Bosnian government, they eventually seized ap-
proximately twenty percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's southwestern ter-
ritory.93 Ironically Serb and Croat troops, who had been fighting
against each other less than six months earlier, were now working to-
gether to carve up the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 9
4
2. The Intervention
Two months after the outbreak of full-scale conflict between Serbia
and Bosnia, the Security Council adopted a resolution on May 30,
1992, 95 that imposed trade sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro - hereinafter "Yugoslavia") for support-
ing aggression. This resolution also expanded the UNPROFOR man-
date to Bosnia and enlarged the duties of the mission. 96 The regional
involvement in the intervention began in July 1992 when the Western
European Union ("WEU") and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") effectuated compliance with the Security Council mandate
through their naval operations.
97
The U.N.'s and European Community's diplomatic efforts, led by
Secretary Vance and Lord David Owen, to resolve the Yugoslav crisis
failed. 98 Meanwhile in November 1992 the Security Council adopted a
resolution calling upon states, acting unilaterally or through regional
organizations, to enforce the embargoes.9 9 A month earlier, the Secu-
rity Council had resolved to ban military flights in Bosnian air space
and called upon states, acting individually or through regional organi-
zations, to help UNPROFOR enforce the ban.10 0 Subsequently, in
90. Id.
91. Id. Although Milosevic had agreed to withdraw the Yugoslav Army, only 14,000
of 89,000 troops actually left. Milosevic transferred the remaining 75,000 troops to the
command of Radovan Karadzic and renamed them the "Army of the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina." Id.
92. PESIC, supra note 67, at 247.
93. RAMET, supra note 68, at 248.
94. Id. at 251.
95. S. RES/757, adopted by the Security Council on May 30, 1992.
96. Id.
97. See THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION:
INTRODUCTION AND BASIC DOCUMENTS 155-58 (A. Bloed ed., 1995). NATO's intervention
in former Yugoslavia is described in Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in
Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F.L. REV. 235, 260-65 (1997).
98. See generally RAMET, supra note 68, at 249-50.
99. S/RES/ 787 (1992).
100. S/RES/781 (1992).
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March 1993, the Security Council adopted another resolution to extend
the no-fly zone to all aircraft and authorized states to take "all neces-
sary measures" to enforce it.101 The next month it passed another
resolution imposing total economic and diplomatic sanctions on Yugo-
slavia. 102 NATO and WEU responded by expanding their operations.
The Security Council adopted several more resolutions, creating
U.N. Safe Areas, "free from armed attacks and from any other hostile
act,"'0 3 empowering UNPROFOR to protect them and promote the
withdrawal of military forces by using force, 1° 4 and inviting the Secre-
tary General to take necessary steps to ensure respect of the Gorazde
Safe Area. 10 5  The Council also authorized air power to assist
UNPROFOR,106 in response to which NATO conducted air strikes. Af-
ter the Bosnian Peace Agreement, signed in Dayton, Ohio, in December
1995,107 the Security Council authorized member states to establish a
multinational implementation force ("IFOR") under unified command
and control and acting through or in cooperation with NATO, and to
take "all necessary measures ... in defense of IFOR or to assist the
force in carrying out its mission. ' 108 It phased out the arms embargo
and suspended sanctions against Yugoslavia. 10 9
3. Appraisal
Initial attempts by the United Nations to intervene and bring about
peace in the former Yugoslavia were again hampered by the lack of
adequate resources at its command, coupled with the lack of political
will of member states to make concerted efforts toward that end. Sub-
sequently, it was the U.S. leadership and intervention by NATO forces
that imposed peace in the region.
C. Haiti
Although the Haitian crisis did not receive the same media atten-
tion as Somalia or Bosnia, it represents another instance in which mas-








106. See SfRES/836 (1993) and S/RES/958 (1994).
107. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reprinted
in 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996).
108. S/RES/1031 (1995).
109. S/RES/1020 (1995); S/RES/1022 (1995).
110. By the time the Security Council adopted a resolution to intervene on July 31,
1994, there were independent reports of widespread massacres of those allegedly suppor-
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1. The Conflict
The Haitian crisis began in September 1991, when newly-elected
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted from office and forced to
flee to the United States."' Aristide had been elected by an over-
whelming majority of Haitian voters in the first free election in Haiti's
history. 112 After Aristide's overthrow by a military junta, widespread
human rights abuses ensued. Over 3,000 Haitians were murdered, and
others were raped, arbitrarily arrested, and tortured." 3 These viola-
tions spurred a massive flight of Haitian citizens who took to makeshift
vessels in hopes of reaching the U.S..
The Organization of American States ("OAS"), with its long history
of intervention in Haiti," 4 was the first to impose sanctions against the
military regime. In an emergency meeting held on September 30, 1991,
the OAS "recommended action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of
those who hold power illegally in Haiti." 115 The Permanent Council of
the OAS went further and called for an economic embargo to isolate
Haiti from the rest of the Western Hemisphere.1 6 Meanwhile, the U.N.
General Assembly passed a resolution supporting these sanctions and
condemning the coup and the ensuing human rights abuses. 117 The
U.N. was also instrumental in universalizing the sanctions originally
imposed by the OAS. At the urging of Western governments, the U.N.
Security Council expanded the OAS embargo of Haiti to include all U.N.
member states."18 However, the U.N. did little else to oust Haiti's mili-
tive of the ousted Haitian President Aristide. Amnesty Reports, Haiti-Human Rights: In-
crease in Violations, GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK, Aug. 24, 1994, at 1 (Lexis/Nexis
News File).
111. See generally INTERAGENCY AND APOLITICAL MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF PEACE
OPERATIONS: HAITI - A CASE STUDY 10 (Margaret D. Hayes & Gary F. Wheatley eds.,
1996); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 85th Sess.,
O.A.S. Doc. OEAISer. L/VIII.85 (Feb. 11, 1994).
112. Aristide, a Catholic priest, garnered sixty-seven percent of the vote. Michael P.
Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes
in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 2 (1996).
113. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HAITI: THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY, HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS SINCE THE COUP (1992). President Clinton described the military junta as
"plainly the most brutal, the most violent regime anywhere in our hemisphere .... [The]
brutal atrocities threaten tens of thousands of Haitians." Gene Gibbons, Clinton Vows
Haiti's Military Will Leave, REUTERS, Sept. 14 1994, Lexis/Nexis Library; President Bill
Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation, Sept. 17, 1994, Lexis/Nexis Library.
114. Haiti: From Intervention to Invasion, CURRENT AFFAIRS, Feb. 1995, at 54.
115. Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OAS Doc. MRE/RES 1/91 (Octo-
ber 3, 1991.)
116. Id. In May, 1992, the OAS passed a second resolution after failed attempts at
negotiations asking member states to renew their commitment to the embargo by denying
port access to ships violating the embargo, denying visa privileges to coup members, and
freezing coup leaders' assets. O.A.S. Doc. OEAJSer. G/CP/SA 896/92(8) (Apr. 1, 1992).
117. G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 13, U.N. Doc.
A/46/L.8/Rev.1 (1992).
118. Diego Arria, Diplomacy and the Four Friends of Haiti, in HAITIAN FRUSTRATIONS:
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tary regime.
Diplomatic attempts to find a negotiated settlement to the Haitian
crisis began early the following year. 119 In February 1992, representa-
tives of Aristide and the military leaders met in Washington, D.C., and
signed the Washington Accord, which called for the selection of a new
Prime Minister as well as amnesty for the military leaders and others
who were involved in the coup. Although the Washington Accord also
acknowledged Aristide as the president, it did not make provisions for
his return to Haiti. Soon after the signing of this agreement, both Aris-
tide and the military regime denounced the Washington Accord, mark-
ing the failure of the first round of negotiations.
The collapse of the Washington Accord demonstrated that during
the year following the coup little progress had been made toward a
resolution of the crisis. The U.S. found itself addressing the issue of
refugees fleeing the repressive C~dras regime and seeking asylum in
the U.S. In May, President George Bush began the controversial policy
of using the U.S. Coast Guard to turn back Haitian refugees intercepted
on the high seas. 120 In September, the OAS sponsored further negotia-
tions between representatives of the military regime and Aristide. Al-
though no resolution was reached on the point of Aristide's return, the
de facto military government did agree to allow human rights observers
into the country.
Although another new year began with the military government
still firmly in power, the newly-elected President Clinton made some
attempts to resolve the crisis the following year. In March 1993,
Clinton named Lawrence Pezzullo as a special advisor on Haiti to the
Secretary of State. The following month the U.S. imposed new eco-
nomic sanctions on Haiti, an oil embargo and a freezing of Haitian as-
sets abroad. In this context of increased pressure on the military lead-
ership, C6dras and Aristide signed the Governors Island Agreement.
The Governors Island Agreement called for a new government and
prime minister, the resignation of the military leaders, a general am-
nesty for those involved in the coup and U.N.-mandated training of
Haiti's police and military. Most significantly, and unlike previous
agreements, the Governors Island Agreement provided for Aristide's re-
turn to Haiti by October 30, 1993.
The signing of the Governors Island Agreement raised hopes for a
peaceful solution to the crisis. In August, the international embargo
against Haiti was lifted and apparent progress toward Aristide's return
to Haiti was made. These hopes, however, were doomed to disappoint-
DILEMMAS FOR U.S. POLICY 95 (Georges A. Fauriol ed., 1995).
119. We have relied heavily upon sources cited in supra notes 111-114 for the following
discussion of Haiti.
120. Although presidential candidate Bill Clinton denounced the Bush Administra-
tion's policy of forced repatriation during the campaign, President Bill Clinton would
eventually continue the policy after taking office.
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ment. In spite of the fact that both Aristide and the military leaders
signed the Governors Island Agreement, they were not really in agree-
ment, because the differences between the two sides had merely been
"papered over."121 This lack of real consensus made itself clear shortly
before the date set for Aristide to return. The prospects for Aristide's
return to Haiti dimmed on October 11 when the American naval ship
U.S.S. Harlan County was turned back from landing in
Port-au-Prince. 122 Two days after this setback, the U.N. re-imposed
economic sanctions and an oil embargo, and the U.S. Navy sailed into
Haitian waters to enforce the embargo. The date set in the Governors
Island Agreement for Aristide's return passed without a resolution to
the crisis. After the failure of the Governors Island Agreement, the
U.S. had no immediate alternative policy, but the Clinton Administra-
tion still hoped for a negotiated resolution.
Negotiations began again in December when Haitian Prime Minis-
ter Robert Malval traveled to Washington to meet with Aristide. Mal-
val, who had come into office in August as part of the Governors Island
Agreement, faced intimidation by the Haitian military, and despite the
fact that he and Aristide needed each other's support against the mili-
tary government, a rift grew between the two of them. 23 Despite this
tension, Malval decided to seek an agreement with Aristide to resolve
the crisis. He traveled to Washington, D.C., where he proposed a plan
which the Clinton Administration endorsed enthusiastically. Under the
Malval Plan, a national conference would choose a new, more broadly-
based government which could negotiate a resolution with the military
leaders in order for them to comply with the Governors Island Agree-
ment. The U.N., the OAS, the Four Friends of Haiti (Venezuela,
France, the U.S., and Canada), and Haiti's political and business lead-
ers all supported the Malval Plan. Aristide, however, rejected it on the
ground that the military would still retain substantial power under this
plan.
Despite Aristide's rejection of the Malval Plan, diplomatic efforts to
resolve the crisis were not at an end. The Four Friends of Haiti sent a
delegation to Haiti and issued a warning to C6dras that unless Haiti's
military leaders stepped down by January 15, 1994, Haiti would face
even tougher sanctions. In spite of this warning, the January 15 dead-
line passed without compliance by the C6dras regime. Attempts at a
diplomatic resolution to the crisis continued in February 1994, when a
Haitian parliamentary delegation traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet
with Aristide. This delegation proposed another solution to the crisis,
121. Georges A. Fauriol and Andrew S. Faiola, Prelude to Intervention, in HAITIAN
FRUSTRATIONS: DILEMMAS FOR U.S. POLICY 103 (Georges A. Fauriol ed.,
1995)[hereinafter Fauriol & Faiola].
122. See generally Kate Doyle, Hollow Diplomacy in Haiti, 11 WORLD POLY J. 50
(1994).
123. See Fauriol & Faiola, supra note 121, at 104.
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calling for a new Prime Minister and government, and the implementa-
tion of the remaining provisions of the Governors Island Agreement.
Aristide also rejected this plan, and demanded tougher sanctions
against the military leaders instead of further efforts at a diplomatic
resolution.
Although the Clinton Administration still favored a diplomatic
solution to the crisis, Aristide and his demands for tougher sanctions
enjoyed support in the U.S. Senate. Under pressure from Aristide's
American supporters the Clinton Administration subsequently an-
nounced its intention to seek tougher sanctions against Haiti, unless
the C6dras regime gave up power and allowed Aristide to return. These
new sanctions included a complete economic embargo and the closure of
Haiti's border with the Dominican Republic. After the military leaders
once more refused to step down, the U.N. imposed these new sanctions
on May 21, 1995. Over the next month, the Clinton Administration
took additional unilateral steps by cutting off all American flights to
Haiti, restricting financial transfers to Haiti from the U.S., revoking all
non-immigrant visas, and preventing Haitians from entering the coun-
try.
2. The Intervention
Unfortunately for the Clinton Administration, even these stricter
sanctions failed to resolve the crisis and force the military leaders out of
power. Hoping that a show of force would compel the military leaders
to step down, the U.S. stationed 2,000 Marines off the Haitian coast,
along with several assault ships and attack helicopters. This step may
have had the unintended consequence of making a military intervention
inevitable. 24 Doubts still remained, however, about taking the final
step, an invasion of Haiti. Weighing against military intervention were
concerns about the risks and commitment involved, as well as the
precedent that such a measure could potentially set.125 However, not-
withstanding these concerns, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 940, authorizing the use of "all necessary means" by a multina-
tional coalition to restore the Aristide government in Haiti. 126
The following month President Clinton officially authorized plans
for invasion, and a State Department representative met with the lead-
ers of four Caribbean nations to form the multinational coalition which
was to carry out the invasion. On September 15, over substantial do-
mestic opposition from Congress, President Clinton delivered a tele-
vised address to the nation and discussed the plans to invade Haiti.
Just when an invasion seemed inevitable and all hope for a peaceful
124. See id. at 112.
125. See id. at 112-13
126. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
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resolution appeared lost, an eleventh hour attempt to find a diplomatic
resolution succeeded.
Two days after President Clinton's televised address, an American
delegation including former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam
Nunn and General Colin Powell arrived in Haiti as a last-minute at-
tempt to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The following day, the
two sides reached a compromise. C6dras agreed that he and the other
military leaders would step down by October 15, and that American
troops could enter Haiti unopposed. On September 19, U.S. troops
landed peacefully in Port-au-Prince. On October 12, C6dras officially
resigned, and Aristide finally returned to Haiti on October 15, 1995.
Although the consolidation of democracy in Haiti was far from com-
plete, the crisis that the military coup had touched off was finally over.
3. Appraisal
The United Nations played a rather limited role in resolving the
Haitian crisis. The OAS's role was equally limited. It is hard to imag-
ine the military junta relinquishing power without the U.S.' threat to
send armed forces into Haiti and the credibility of that threat as per-
ceived by the junta. However, both the U.N. and the OAS had endorsed
the U.S. leadership in mounting an interventionary force, and the out-




In a little over three months in the summer of 1994, between
500,000 and 800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutus, died tragically in a
genocidal campaign. While this slaughter took most of the world by
surprise, there was sufficient early warning that such a massacre might
occur. However, the United Nations and member states took no effec-
tive action to prevent the disaster. Nor did they intervene to stop the
killings. 128 Rwanda had in fact suffered several massacres since the
127. For two opposite views on the Haiti intervention, see James Morell, Haiti: Suc-
cess Under Fire (1995 Report of the Center for International Policy) (in support of inter-
vention); Richard Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for
the United Nations, 36 HARV. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
128. See generally U.N. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA, 1993-1996 (1996)[hereinafter U.N. AND RWANDA]; STUDY 1-5, THE JOINT
EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
CONFLICT AND GENOCIDE: LESSONS FROM THE RWANDA EXPERIENCE (1996); GERALD
PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE (1995); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
AFRICA, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: APRIL-MAY 1994 (1994); ARTICLE 19, BROADCASTING
GENOCIDE - CENSORSHIP, PROPAGANDA AND STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN RWANDA
(1990-1994) (1996); Holly Burkhalter, The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administra-
tion and Rwanda, WORLD POL'Y J., Winter 1994/1995, at 44; Peter Rosenbloom, Book Re-
view: The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 313 (1997).
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1950s-in 1959, 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993.129 De-
spite this, the 1994 genocide was unprecedented. To provide an appro-
priate context for understanding the failure of the international com-
munity to prevent the 1994 massacre, we will briefly review Rwanda's
post-colonial history, early U.N. and regional efforts aimed at halting
violence in the region, and the events immediately preceding the sum-
mer of 1994.
1. The Conflict
Prior to the 1994 massacre, Rwanda was one of the most densely
populated countries in the world. Within its population two major eth-
nic groups existed. The Hutus accounted for eighty-five percent of the
total population, while the Tutsis comprised roughly fourteen percent of
the population. 130 In spite of the fact that the Hutus formed the major-
ity group, the Tutsis had ruled over the Hutus since the sixteenth cen-
tury. 13 1 Prior to colonization, the Tutsis had maintained "reciprocal ob-
ligations and allowed for a degree of social mobility," thereby quelling
ethnic violence. 132 After World War I, German and Belgian colonizers
exploited ethnic differences between the Hutus and Tutsis, creating a
system of ethnic stratification between two culturally and linguistically
homogenous groups. 133
By 1959, Belgium, under pressure from the United Nations General
Assembly, instituted democratic reforms in Rwanda, which had become
a trust territory of Belgium under U.N. auspices. Democratization, as
could be expected, met with strong support among the Hutu population,
and fierce opposition among the Tutsi minority. Despite constitutional
changes that gave the Hutus greater representation, the Tutsi minority
retained control over Rwanda. During this period of post-colonial de-
mocratization, the first Hutu uprising claimed the lives of hundreds of
Tutsis and drove thousands more from the country. Through this up-
rising, Hutus gained control of Rwanda upon its independence in 1961.
Fear of this Hutu-led government caused over 200,000 Tutsis to flee to
neighboring Uganda and other countries.
In 1973, General Habyarimana seized power in a military coup.
We have relied heavily on these sources for the following discussion on Rwanda.
129. See Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in
Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1125 (1994).
130. U.S. Agency for International Development, Rwanda-Civil Strife/ Displaced Per-
sons 1 (Situation Report No. 4, 1994).
131. JASON A. DZUBOW, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL WAR IN RWANDA 513
(1994).
132. See generally GuY VASSALL-ADAMS, RWANDA: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL
AcTION (1994).
133. Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in
Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49, 52 (1995).
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Habyarimana, a Hutu, governed Rwanda for the next twenty years
through the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Devel-
opment ("MRND"), Rwanda's sole political party. In part, he main-
tained control by refusing to repatriate Tutsi refugees living in other
countries, invoking Rwanda's poor economic conditions. In 1990, how-
ever, efforts by the Organization of African Unity ("OAU") and the Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR")
compelled Habyarimana to enter into talks regarding political reform.
But the process proved fruitless when the Rwandese Patriotic Front
("RPF"'), comprising Tutsis who had earlier fled from Rwanda, invaded
from Uganda, killing hundreds of Rwandans and displacing thousands
more. In spite of the MRND's numerous human rights violations
against Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the peace process resumed on Oc-
tober 17, 1990, and continued through the rest of the year.134 Evidence
suggests that Habyarimana, through a campaign of hate propaganda,
promoted hatred and fear of Tutsis. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
the Question of Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions stated
that since the RPF attacks in 1993, all Tutsis within Rwanda had been
labeled accomplices of the RPF and Hutu members of the opposition
party were considered traitors. Between 1990 and the massacre in
1994, the Habyarimana government feigned cooperation with those in-
terested in reform, while actually promoting ethnic hatred within
Rwanda.
The floodgate of ethnic hatred opened on April 6, 1994, when
Habyarimana's airplane was shot down as he was returning from a re-
gional peace summit in Dar es Salaam. His death set off a chain reac-
tion of indiscriminate killing of Tutsis and Hutu opposition members,
led by the Presidential Guard. This massacre sparked renewed fighting
between the RPF and the Rwandan Government Army which lasted un-
til July 18, when the RPF took control of the country. 135 This armed
conflict, coupled with the MNDR's inflammatory broadcasts, created
widespread fear and displaced 1.5 million people. After gaining control,
the RPF established a government with a broad representative base.
2. The Intervention
Early U.N. efforts were focused primarily on promoting cease-fire
agreements between the Rwandan government and Tutsi guerrillas13 6
These efforts, while not addressing human rights violations in Rwanda,
played a decisive role in promoting the Arusha Peace Agreement. The
Arusha Peace Agreement sought the U.N.'s oversight of the installation
134. Africa Watch, Talking Peace and Waging War (1992); Africa Watch, Beyond the
Rhetoric: Continuing Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda (1993).
135. Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. U.N. Doc. S/1994/1133 (1994).
136. See Kimberly D. Barnes, International Law, the United Nations, and Intervention
in Civil Conflicts, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 117, 136 (1995).
VOL. 26:5
1998 TRAGEDIES IN SOMALIA, YUGOSLAVIA, HAITI, RWANDA... 849
of a broad-based transitional government terminating upon national
elections. The Agreement was designed to help unify the armed forces
of the government and the RPF and to oversee the cease-fire as estab-
lished by the Agreement. Both parties, under direction from Tanzanian
President Mwinyi, requested U.N. assistance in implementing the
Arusha Peace Agreement after its signing.
The U.N. had been previously involved in the region through the
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda ("UNOMUR'), de-
ployed in June 1993.137 UNOMUR's primary purpose was to ensure
that no military assistance from surrounding countries flowed into
Rwanda. The Arusha Agreement served as an invitation for a U.N.
peacekeeping operation and led to the establishment of the United Na-
tions Assistance Mission for Rwanda ("UNAMIR"). UNAMIR's mission
was to provide short-term peacekeeping operations involving monitor-
ing of the Arusha cease-fire provisions, erecting safe zones, overseeing
the transitional government, and providing a security presence in Ki-
gali. The UNAMIR plan consisted of four phases. First, the U.N. would
establish a broad-based transitional government in Kigali. Second, the
armed forces would be demobilized and integrated. Third, the U.N,
would expand and monitor the Demilitarized Zones ("DMZs") through-
out Rwanda and along the Rwanda-Uganda border. Fourth, the mis-
sion would terminate with nationwide elections in Rwanda.
UNAMIR succeeded in meeting its early goals, but failed to bring
lasting peace to the region. In the first ninety day phase, the Secretary-
General reported to the Security Council that the political aspects were
stabilizing under the leadership of the U.N. Special Representative,
that steps toward demilitarizing Rwanda were underway, and that hu-
manitarian relief efforts had commenced. 138 However, the Secretary-
General also pointed out that during November 1993 two mass slayings
in and around the DMZs occurred, humanitarian relief efforts had been
interrupted by violence in Burundi, and a serious drought had occurred.
The Secretary-General also stressed the importance of continued coop-
eration and support from Member States. However, as time passed and
the crisis deepened, the support of U.N. Member States would falter,
hindering U.N. efforts in Rwanda.
Security Council Resolution 893, passed on January 6, 1994, called
for the deployment of a second battalion of U.N. troops ahead of sched-
ule. Despite this increased U.N. presence, the creation of the transi-
tional government was delayed, creating further tension within the
country. By March 1994, a deadlock in the creation of the transitional
government created tremendous impediments for the U.N..
One day before the fateful April 6 plane crash, the Security Council
137. See S.C. Res. 846, U.N. SCOR, 3244th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/846 (1993).
138. Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR, U.N. Doc. S/26927, December 30,
1993.
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passed Resolution 909, extending UNAMIR's mandate and calling for
the parties to resolve their differences. The death of President
Habyarimana and the ensuing genocide in its aftermath soon over-
whelmed this call. Rather than taking immediate action, the U.N. re-
duced UNAMIR forces from 2165 to 1515.
In a memorandum Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent to the Security
Council, he presented three options to the Council. The first was to
massively expand the number of troops in Rwanda and enlarge its
mandate under Chapter VII to authorize UNAMIR to "coerce" a cease-
fire. This option would have required Security Council action and the
provision of equipment and troops from Member States. Conversely,
the U.N. could withdraw its forces completely. The third option, the in-
termediate alternative, was the one accepted by the Security Council in
Resolution 912. Resolution 912 provided authorization to continue with
the existing mission with reduced U.N. personnel of only 270, author-
izing them to act as an intermediary between the Rwandan government
and the RPF.139
Continued .massacres, however, compelled the U.N. to re-evaluate
this decision, since Resolution 912 did not empower UNAMIR to bring
an end to the grisly massacres taking place in Rwanda. Furthermore,
this resolution seemed to convey the international community's lack of
concern about the situation in Rwanda. Finally, on May 17, 1994, over
a month after the commencement of the genocide in Rwanda, the Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 918, under which it expanded UNAMIR
personnel to 5,500. Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council im-
posed an arms embargo on Rwanda. However, the unwillingness of
Member States to contribute troops and equipment drastically delayed
the deployment of this mission. After the Somali experience, the U.S.
was reluctant to address U.N. intervention in Rwanda, and refused
even to acknowledge the genocide, using instead the language that "acts
of genocide may have occurred."'
140
With efforts to revive UNAMIR stalled, the French government
stepped forward with an offer to lead a multilateral force in Rwanda
similar to the American-led UNITAF mission in Somalia. Part of this
proposal required the Security Council to grant the Rwanda mission the
right to use force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Two days
later, Security Council resolution 929 authorized France to use "all nec-
essary means" to achieve humanitarian objectives in Rwanda. This op-
eration, known as "Operation Turquoise," represented only the second
time that a non-U.N. force received authorization to use force for hu-
manitarian reasons.
139. See U.N. AND RWANDA, supra note 128, at 43 , Boutros-Ghali's version, and the
actual memorandum, at 264-65.
140. See Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killing "Genocide,"
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at A8.
VOL. 26:5850
1998 TRAGEDIES IN SOMALIA, YUGOSLAVIA, HAITI, RWANDA... 851
The French-led force was dispatched immediately. Operation Tur-
quoise's first task was the establishment of safe zones for the fleeing
Hutus. Despite the widespread skepticism that the French were not
impartial and were in fact supporting the Hutus, this effort, in conjunc-
tion with the RPF's military victory, brought an end to the largest
population movement in modern times. 141 Once security had been es-
tablished, UNAMIR and UNAMIR II troops took over from Operation
Turquoise on August 21, 1994.
3. Appraisal
Could the genocide in Rwanda have been prevented? Could it have
been halted by forcible intervention? Based on the evidence presented
in the various studies mentioned earlier,1 42 the answer to both of these
questions has to be in the affirmative. There is plenty of blame to go
around - the Secretary-General, the U.N. and its member states, espe-
cially the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, with the
U.S. in the lead share the blame. If there is a clear-cut case to be made
for intervention, Rwanda was it. The Rwandan tragedy also makes a
powerful case for the creation of a standing U.N. quick-reaction volun-
tary force. 143
E. Liberia
The Liberian civil war was the first case in which a sub-regional
group and the United Nations intervened as partners. Although it was
not an effective partnership, the Liberian experience aptly illustrates
that the world community regards humanitarian intervention as a valid
exception to non-intervention when egregious human rights violations
occur within a state.
1. The Conflict
44
The roots of the Liberian civil war, which began in 1989, can be
traced to perennial tribal animosities and conflicts, 145 or recurring
abuse of power by the ruling elites who have always oppressed the citi-
zenry. 146 Perhaps a combination of these factors was responsible for
Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe's coup of April 12, 1980, which ended 130
141. U.N. AND RWANDA, supra note 128, at 56.
142. See the authorities cited in supra note 128.
143. For a persuasive proposal for such a force, see Carl Keysen & George W.
Rathjens, Send in the Troops: A U.N. Foreign Legion, 20 WASH. Q. 207 (Winter 1997).
144. This is an adapted and updated version of Ved P. Nanda, Civil War in Liberia: A
Reexamination of the Doctrine of Nonintervention, in AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et. al. eds., 1996).
145. See, e.g., J. GUS LIEBENOW, LIBERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE (1970); J. Gus
LIEBENOW, LIBERIA: THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY (1987).
146. See, e.g., MARTIN LOWENKOPF, THE POLITICS OF LIBERIA vii (1970).
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years of the rule of Americo-Liberians, an elite group of descendants of
freed American slaves who founded Liberia in 1847. Although the
country was independent rather than colonized by any European power,
the settlers were repressive and exploitative. 1 47  Doe toppled the
authoritarian regime of President William Tolbert (1971-1980), which
had become increasingly repressive in its effort to silence political dis-
sent.148
Despite its promises to institute fundamental structural reforms,
the Doe regime came to be known as the most corrupt and brutal re-
gime in Liberia's history. It imposed Draconian laws, violated human
rights with impunity, and unleashed a reign of terror. 149 Doe was a
member of the Krahn, a minority ethnic group from the east, and he
promised to provide for the indigenous tribespeople of Liberia. This he
failed to do for any but his own people, many of whom he promoted to
power regardless of their complete lack of qualification. 150 In October
1985, his National Democratic Party of Liberia was declared the winner
in national elections that were marked by fraud.' 5 ' Following four more
years of Doe's severe repression, the stage was set for the bloody civil
war in Liberia.
Charles Taylor, who had served under Doe as head of his procure-
ment agency but fled to avoid being tried for corruption, launched a
guerilla movement which invaded Liberia late in 1989. His goal was to
quickly overthrow Doe, but instead Liberia became mired in a deadly
and protracted civil war. Taylor, a member of the Americo-Liberian
elite, began his rebellion in Nimba County, home of the Gio and Mano
ethnic groups, which suffered greatly under Doe. 152 As the rebel group,
known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia ("NPFL"), attracted
thousands of followers, Taylor's soldiers targeted not only Krahn but
also the allied Mandingo tribespeople with horrendous acts of brutal-
ity. 53 Eventually, Taylor overtook much of Liberia, including parts of
the capitol, Monrovia.
The international community for the most part stood by while these
atrocities took place. The United Nations did nothing, and the Organi-
zation of African Unity ("OAU") felt constrained by the principle of non-
intervention. As Doe had announced he would not be a candidate for
147. See M.S. David, The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here, REV. AFRICAN POL.
ECONOMY, No. 31, at 57 (1984); Gerald Bourke, A Once-Proud Nation Looks Wistfully
West, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 21, 1990, at 11.
148. See generally George May Kieh, Jr., The Causes of the Liberian Coup, 6
TRANSAFRICA FORUM, No. 2, 1989, at 45.
149. See, e.g., LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIBERIA: A PROMISE
BETRAYED (1986).
150. See supra notes 145 and 147.
151. See supra note 149, at 18.
152. See generally B. Berkeley, Liberia: Between Repression and Slaughter, ATLANTIC,
Dec. 1992, at 52-64.
153. See id.
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president in the next elections, the U.S. considered that there was some
chance for a negotiated settlement 5 4 and ruled out direct intervention
to impose a cease-fire and political settlement. Only the Economic
Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") directly intervened,
calling upon the fighting parties to end the conflict peacefully.
Religious leaders brokered and mediated cease-fire talks between
Doe's and Taylor's forces in Freetown, Sierra Leone, with no success.
Then in August 1990, under the auspices of ECOWAS, six of its mem-
ber West African states agreed on a plan to send in military contingents
from Sierra Leone and Guinea, assisted by a smaller Nigerian contin-
gent, with the intent of preventing further bloodshed and restoring ba-
sic security. 155 Three of the six states, Gambia, Mali, and Togo, were
members of the ECOWAS standing mediation committee, and Sierra
Leone and Guinea were already involved in sheltering thousands of Li-
berian refugees. Together with Nigeria, they hoped to assist in install-
ing an interim government in Monrovia with opposition participation,
and also to facilitate elections within six months. In order to do so, they
would need to prevent Taylor from seizing power. It was considered
that "[h]e may be invited to join the interim government; though un-
likely to welcome the ECOWAS initiative, he may have no option but to
accept."1
56
One reporter proposed that the initiative was undertaken because
"none of the member states likes the idea of a fellow West African gov-
ernment coming to power as a result of civil war." 157 The U.S. govern-
ment was reported at that time to be privately supporting the initia-
tive 58 while France openly backed it. 15 9
The plan, however, came under attack from Taylor and others who
considered that the action "would be nothing less than an invasion,"
and criticized the ECOWAS initiative as an attempt to "show citizens in
other African nations that it would be futile to attempt to overthrow
dictatorial governments in their own countries."' 60 But the Nigerian
government stated that "Nigeria and other countries could not sit by
154. See Statement from U.S. Embassy, Freetown, Sierra Leone, quoted in REUTERS,
June 21, 1990, BC cycle. Earlier, thousands of Liberians had danced and sung in the
streets during a heavy tropical downpour to demand U.S. intervention. Intervention Call,
INDEPENDENT, June 15, 1990, at 10.
155. See Naomi Wimbourne, Nigeria Tells Liberia It Plans Military Intervention,
REUTERS, Aug. 3, 1990; Robert Powell, West Africa to Demand Ceasefire from Liberian
Rebel Leader, REUTERS, Aug. 15, 1990.




159. See France Backs Liberia Intervention Force, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE,
Aug. 3, 1990.
160. Comments by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a finance minister in the overthrown gov-
ernment of President Tolbert and by Tom WoWeiyu, Washington-based spokesman for
NPFL. Michael Knipe, Liberia Rebel 'No' to Intervention, THE TIMES, July 7, 1990.
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while their nationals were trapped in the war-torn country without
food, water, or medical facilities."16 1 The first aim was evacuation of its
nationals, but it also "aim[ed] to restore peace and stability in Liberia
and end a conflict which, if left unchecked, would endanger regional se-
curity."162 Accordingly, Nigeria announced it would intervene.
63
Complicating the situation was the involvement of another rebel
faction led by Prince Yormie Johnson, a former commander under
Charles Taylor who had a fall out with Taylor's main rebel army. The
reasons for the split between Prince Johnson and Mr. Taylor were not
clear, but the rivalry was serious enough that skirmishes and even one
significant battle took place early on between the two rebel leaders'
troops.164
While pressure mounted upon the U.S. to intervene, 65 the OAU
seemed unwilling to take any action to respond to the crisis. 66 Charles
Taylor "continue[d] to insist that this [was] an internal matter."'167
Taylor denounced both the Nigerian promise to intervene and the pos-
sibility of U.S. intervention as infringements of national sovereignty.
168
At the same time, he said that the U.S. must share some of the blame
for Samuel Doe's "crimes," as it had given such substantial aid to Doe
during his 10-year rule, 69 and charged unofficial parties in the U.S.
with supporting Prince Johnson against the main NPFL.170 Prince
Johnson, on the other hand, stated that he would welcome intervention
by the United Nations, or an African force.
171
As ECOWAS convened a mini-summit in Gambia in early August
to endorse just such an intervention of Liberia, the Ghanaian High
Commissioner in Lagos said that the action could no longer be consid-
ered a violation of sovereignty because there was no effective govern-
ment in Liberia. 17 2 Charles Taylor's rebel forces orchestrated a massive
demonstration of civilian refugees to show support for his opposition to
161. Nigeria Considers Intervention in Liberia, REUTERS, Aug. 3, 1990, BC cycle.
162. Naomi Wimborne, Nigeria Tells Liberia it Plans Military Intervention, REUTERS,
Aug. 3, 1990, AM cycle, quoting a senior government source in Lagos.
163. Id.
164. See Robert Powell, Liberia's Rival Rebel Vies for Supremacy, INDEPENDENT, July
31, 1990.
165. See Pope Urges Liberia's Allies to Help End Civil War, Aug. 1, 1990, REUTERS, BC
cycle. Up to 600 civilians taking shelter in a church in Monrovia were reported to have
been killed by government troops.
166. See Intervention in Liberia, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, at 16.
167. Id.
168. See Gill Tudor, Rebel Leader Vows to Resist Foreign Intervention in Liberia,
REUTERS, Aug. 3, 1990, AM cycle.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Michael Roddy, Liberian Rebels Fight Government Troops Through Capital
Streets, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 1990, BC cycle.
172. See Naomi Wimborne, Wide Support Expected for Nigerian-Led Intervention in
Liberia, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 1990, BC cycle.
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any outside involvement. The demonstrators were part of 200,000 refu-
gees who had been sheltered at a University campus near Monrovia,
and the NPFL had assumed responsibility for their well-being, but it
was unable to actually take care of them for lack of provisions. Thus, as
the refugees were marched out by the rebels to express their defiance
with placards proclaiming to the ECOWAS meeting, "We want no so-
called peacekeepers," and "We can handle our own affairs," one reporter
called it "a pathetic, unconvincing charade." 173 Many West African na-
tionals at the refugee camp feared for their lives after six Nigerians
were killed there by the NPFL.
174
The intervention was announced by ECOWAS as a "humanitarian
intervention,"' 175 to ensure that food and medical supplies got to those
who needed them and to safely evacuate ECOWAS and other foreign
nationals. 176 It was noted, as the news broke about the finalizing of the
peace-keeping force that both Doe and Prince Johnson had indicated
that they would welcome the ECOWAS force.1 77 Taylor did not object
outright, as he was reassessing his position and his chances at over-
taking Doe alone and the probability that if not for the combined action
of ECOWAS, Nigeria and Guinea would act on their own.178 But a few
days later about 1,800 Nigerians taking refuge in the Nigerian Em-
bassy in Monrovia were forced to flee when forces believed to be tied to
Taylor's rebels ransacked the building.179 The U.S., which continued to
stress that it would not take sides, sent 225 marines into Monrovia to
reinforce security and evacuate the U.S. embassy. 80 The Liberian am-
bassador to Nigeria accused the U.S. of arming the Liberian anti-
government forces and undertaking other activities in support of the
rebels against the Doe government.'
8 1
The Taylor forces launched a last-minute attack on the presidential
mansion in an attempt to oust Doe before the arrival of the ECOWAS
peace-keeping force. In the process of moving into the mansion area
from the eastern suburbs, they also had to fight Prince Johnson's forces
on the port side of Monrovia. 8 2 As the ECOWAS forces prepared to
173. Gerald Bourke, Liberia's Refugees Caught Between Army and Rebels,
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 7, 1990, at 10.
174. Id.
175. See ECOWAS to Dispatch Intervention Force to Liberia, XINHUA GENERAL
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 7, 1990, Item No. 0807024.
176. Id.
177. Id., citing Ghanaian Foreign Secretary Obed Asamoah, returning from the Ban-
jul, Gambia meeting of ECOWAS.
178. Id.
179. See Nigeria Says its Monrovia Embassy Ransacked by Rebels, REUTERS, Aug. 9,
1990, AM cycle.
180. See Robert Powell, West African Peacekeeping Force to Move into Liberia Next
Week, REUTERS, Aug. 10, 1990, BC cycle.
181. See Liberian Ambassador Accuses Washington of Backing Anti-Government
Forces, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 11, 1990.
182. See Liberian Anti-Government Forces Launch Final Attack on Presidential Man-
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move into Liberia, Taylor clearly was one of the most serious obstacles
facing them. 8 3 Observers noted that the West seemed to be holding
back in supporting the African countries' effort, perhaps doubting that
the operation was viable because of inadequate planning.1
8 4
2. Intervention
As the ECOWAS troops-now known as ECOMOG (ECOWAS
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group)- poised to move into Monrovia under
the command of Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo, one observer re-
ported that Taylor announced he was willing to participate in the cease-
fire and that ECOWAS and the OAU did have a role to play toward a
meaningful solution of the conflict. 185 He accepted an invitation to talks
led by the ECOWAS mediation committee. 8 6 Taylor, however, simul-
taneously appeared to be consolidating his hold on Monrovia as he
blocked roads and refused to let expatriates of any of the West African
countries involved in the peace-keeping mission leave Liberia.1
8 7
Liberians and nationals from other countries were fleeing over
land, while some were evacuated by sea, including a U.S. evacuation of
nearly 2,325 foreigners.1 88 Guineans and Nigerians, however, were not
permitted to leave, 8 9 as evidenced by the two thousand Nigerians re-
ported to be trapped in the Nigerian embassy. 190 Taylor contended that
Guinea and Nigeria had militarily supported the Liberian army and
that their participation in the peacekeeping force meant that it could
not be construed as neutral.19' Meanwhile, Taylor failed to show up for
the ECOWAS talks which he had agreed on in Gambia, due to an auto-
mobile accident. The talks were rescheduled. 192
Taylor's troops tried to prevent the 4,000-man peace-keeping force
from landing as it arrived by flotilla in Monrovia port on August 25,
sion, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 11, 1990.
183. See Robert Powell, Troops for Liberia Peace-Keeping Force Gather in Sierra Leone,
REUTERS, Aug. 12, 1990, AM cycle.
184. See William Keeling and Michael Holman, Tough Logistical Obstacles Face Libe-
ria Task Force, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at 4.
185. See Three Warring Parties in Liberia Agree to ECOWAS' Military Intervention,
XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 14, 1990.
186. Id.
187. See Gill Tudor, West Africans Refused Passage from Liberia as Diplomats Leave,
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 1990, BC cycle.
188. See Gill Tudor, Taylor Will Attend Peace Talks, Liberian Rebels Say, REUTERS,
Aug. 19, 1990, BC cycle; Peace Force of 3,000 Ready to Sail to Monrovia, INDEPENDENT,
Aug. 22, 1990, at 10.
189. See Robert Powell, U.S. Navy to Evacuate 400 Indians from Liberia by Helicopter,
REUTERS, Aug. 16, 1990, BC cycle.
190. See id.
191. See Gerald Bourke, Liberians Must Agree to Truce, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 17, 1990,
at 8.
192. See Robert Powell, Liberia Peacekeeping Force Bigger than Anticipated, REUTERS,
Aug. 17, 1990, BC cycle.
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1990. But Prince Johnson's fighters held the port and after a 13-hour
battle between Taylor's and Johnson's men, the peace-keepers were able
eventually to dock without opposition. 193 The Taylor-led rebels, con-
tinuing to accuse Guinea and Nigeria of supporting Doe, attempted to
widen the mediation efforts, calling upon all 16 members of ECOWAS
to become involved in a summit to end the war.' 94 A split in ECOWAS
between English speaking countries such as Nigeria and Ghana and
Franco-phone nations such as Senegal and Burkina Faso frustrated at-
tempts to gain progress toward a cease-fire. 195 Senegal appeared to
have no interest in the peace-keeping move and Burkina Faso, charged
with supporting the Taylor forces, had openly opposed the ECOWAS
military intervention.' 96 Diplomatic efforts were attempted with heads
of the dissident countries, 197 as Taylor declared war on ECOMOG on
September 3.198
The Frenchgovernment was formally charged through its ambassa-
dor to Nigeria with supporting the Francophone countries' opposition to
the ECOWAS peace-keeping force. 199 Taylor's rebels were said to pos-
sess French arms supplied through the Ivory Coast and Burkina
Faso.20 0 The Nigerian government also expressed its fears that the re-
sistance by the Francophone countries would result in a split in
ECOWAS itself.20 ' France denied that it was behind the arms sup-
ply.20
2
Prince Johnson's troops captured Samuel Doe when he made an
unscheduled visit to the ECOMOG headquarters building on September
9203 and shot him in both legs. Johnson's reported intention was to hold
Doe for court martial. He told the press that Doe had surrendered con-
trol of the country, 204 but shortly thereafter the Doe faction announced
a replacement for Doe as head of the government. 20 5 On September 10,
Doe was reported to have died of his gunshot wounds and possibly tor-
193. See Robert Powell, Liberia Peacekeeping Force Clashes with Taylor Rebels,
REUTERS, Aug. 25, 1990, BC cycle.
194. See Rebels Ask for West African Summit on Liberian Civil War, REUTERS, Aug.
26, 1990, BC cycle.
195. See ECOWAS Leaders to Hold Emergency Meeting on Liberian Crisis, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Sep. 6, 1990.
196. See id.
197. See ECOWAS Head Asks Burkina Faso to Speed Peace in Liberia, REUTERS, Sep.
7, 1990, BC cycle.
198. See id.
199. See Nigeria Warns Against French Involvement in Liberian Crisis, XINHUA




203. See Doe Captured, Rebel Leader Johnson Claims Control of Liberia, REUTERS,
Sep. 9, 1990, BC cycle.
204. See id.
205, See Doe Associates Appoint Interim Leader of Liberia, REUTERS, Sep. 10, 1990, BC
cycle.
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ture in questioning by Johnson's troops. 20 6 His body was said to have
been paraded at the ECOMOG headquarters where he had been shot.207
As time went on, news reports revealed that observers found the
incident to be a result of ECOMOG's weaknesses: Doe had apparently
arrived with a large contingent of bodyguards to see General Quainoo
when Johnson arrived with his own men a few minutes later. Johnson's
men invoked a truce between themselves and Doe's forces, persuading
Doe's bodyguards to lay down their weapons, then opened fire on
them.208 Apparently ECOMOG itself considered this a humiliation, and
it soon appointed Nigerian Major Genneral Joshua Dogonyaro as field
commander to restructure the ECOMOG force.
20 9
When Charles Taylor still would not accept any kind of cease-fire
and instead continued to push rapidly toward the former Doe executive
mansion, ECOMOG troops were given new orders in mid-September to
return fire whenever they were attacked, rather than "stand[ing] by
peacefully and get[ting] killed."210 Thus ECOMOG was to be considered
a "peace-enforcing force" rather than a "peace-keeping force."211 Tay-
lor's troops on September 14 sacked the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia
and took away thousands of Nigerian civilians who were camped in-
side.2
12
On September 22, Charles Taylor unilaterally announced a truce,
supposedly because of his expressed concern about the sufferings of the
people of his country.2 13 The heralded cease-fire was broken only eight
days later as the factions resumed fighting with one another. Prince
Johnson concluded that there was now no hope of peace talks to end the
war. Declaring all-out war against Taylor on September 30, he stated:
"Negotiations have failed .... I think that violence is the only solution
to establish real democracy in Liberia. 21 4
ECOWAS convened a conference of Liberian exiles in late August,
to elect an interim government led by Amos Sawyer. 215 Taylor, too, an-
nounced the formation of an interim government, with himself as its
206. See Nigerian Officer to Restructure Liberia Peace Force, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 1990,
PM cycle.
207. See Liberia: President Reported Killed, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sep. 10, 1990.
208. See Gill Tudor, Taylor's Liberian Rebels Sack Nigerian Embassy, Sources Say,
REUTERS, Sep. 14, 1990, BC cycle.
209. See Nigerian Officer to Restructure Liberia Peace Force, REUTERS, Sep. 21, 1990,
PM cycle.
210. ECOMOG Ordered to Return Fire, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE,
Sep. 14, 1990, quoting a senior ECOMOG officer.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See ECOWAS Peace-Keeping Force to Enforce Ceasefire in Liberia, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Sep. 23, 1990.
214. Liberian Rebel Leader Declares All-Out War, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 1990, BC cycle.
215. See Clement E. Adibe, supra note 14, at 475.
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president.2 16 ECOMOG was now dragged into the conflict, joining
Prince Johnson's INPFL (Independent National Patriotic Front of Libe-
ria) army and the AFL (Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia) against Tay-
lor.217 The force, now numbering 7,000, had taken over Bensonaville,
near Monrovia, and was moving toward the area where 100,000 refu-
gees were sheltered. 218 ECOWAS scheduled an emergency meeting to
discuss the crisis, but the split between French-speaking and English-
speaking interests resulted in the meeting again being postponed. 219
In the midst of the chaos, world aid organizations were struggling
to support the half-million refugees and tens of thousands of displaced,
sick, and starving civilians suffering from the war. 220 Finally on No-
vember 28, 1990, at an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS in Mali,
Taylor agreed to a cease-fire that would eventually hold for some 20
months. 221 The impetus for the agree,ment was pressure from West Af-
rican foreign ministers upon supporters of Taylor's forces, particularly
Burkina Faso, Libya and the Ivory Coast.2 2 2 The cease-fire accord was
also signed by representatives of Prince Johnson's INPFL, which sup-
ported the ECOMOG/Sawyer interim government, and the AFL.223 Un-
der the accord, Taylor was not required to recognize Sawyer, leaving the
implication that Taylor would have a part in the future interim gov-
ernment.224 The cease-fire led in October 1994 to the Yamoussoukro IV
Accord.
This situation, more a stalemate than a truce, lasted about 20
months as the ECOMOG-supported government of Sawyer-
administered Monrovia, and Taylor controlled most of the country-
side. 225 The cease-fire ended and the second war began when a new
group of Doe loyalists, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for
Democracy (ULIMO), began full-scale fighting with the other factions in
August 1992.226 Elections, tentatively scheduled for November 30 and
agreed to by all the Liberian parties, were frustrated by the heightened
tensions. The fighting expanded, causing over 3,000 new casualties. 227
216. See Fresh Fighting Delays Sawyer's Return to Monrovia, XINHUA GENERAL
OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 9, 1990.
217. See ECOWAS Leaders to Meet in Cote D'Ivoire, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 13, 1990.
218. See ECOWAS Chairman Defends ECOMOG Offensive in Liberia, XINHUA
GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17, 1990.
219. See id.
220. See Guinea Reaffirms Commitment to Liberia Peace Force, REUTERS, Oct. 19,
1990.
221. See Mark Huband, Liberian Rebel Leader Forced to Sign Cease-Fire, UPI, Nov.




225. See Cindy Shiner, Liberian Vote Under Fire, AFRICA NEWS, Sep. 28, 1992.
226. See id.
227. See Ved Nanda, The Libyan Nightmare is Not Yet Over, DENVER POST, No . 22,
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The conflict had a far-reaching effect, with the U.S. withdrawing its
ambassador from Burkina Faso after it accused that country of con-
tinuing to supply Taylor with arms from Libya, 228 and with the U.S. and
France exchanging accusations of complicity.
229
Until November 1992, the United Nations deferred to ECOWAS
and ECOMOG. In 1990, then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuel-
lar had approved ECOWAS's action in Liberia "as a welcome precedent
for conflict resolution." 230 With the latest developments, however, and
with more members of ECOWAS uniting against the war, ECOWAS
looked to the U.N. to avert a renewal of the bloodshed.2
31
Initially several African countries were opposed to the U.N. Secu-
rity Council involvement in the civil war in Liberia which they consid-
ered to be an internal African affair. 232 But in light of subsequent de-
velopments and at the urging of ECOWAS through the Organization of
African Unity, which represented ECOWAS at the U.N., the Security
Council took action. It met on November 19, 1992 and passed a resolu-
tion imposing an arms embargo on the rebel factions in Liberia and
authorizing a fact-finding mission to assess the situation there.2 33 The
U.N. endorsed the efforts of ECOMOG without specifically mentioning
its military intervention.234
Several peace agreements followed without bringing an end to the
conflict. 2 35 The following is a brief account of the ECOWAS and U.N.
efforts. This is unlike the preceding discussion, which detailed the con-
flict and the initiation of the ECOWAS intervention. It should be re-
called that this intervention was in marked departure from the prior
1992, Section Perspective, at 4H; Richard Boucher, State Department Briefing, Nov. 2,
1992, Federal News Service, NEXIS Library.
228. See Tom Masland and Jeffrey Bartholet, The Perils of Peacekeeping, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 16, 1992, at 53.
229. See Joseph Fitchett, Liberia's Crisis Tests U.S.-French Cooperation,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 19, 1992.
230. See Peter da Costa, Liberia: Peacemakers Look to the U.N. as Mediation Runs Out
of Steam, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sep. 23, 1992.
231. See id.
232. D. Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS (L. Dam-
rosch ed., 1993).
233. U.N. Doc. SIRES/788 (Nov. 19, 1992). See U.N. Council to Back West Africans on
Liberia, Reuters, Nov. 18, 1992.
234. See id.
235. On the conflict and intervention, see generally Clement Adibe, supra note 14; Max
Sesay, Politics and Society in Post-War Liberia, 34 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 402
(1996); Quentin Outram, 'It's Terminal Either Way. An Analysis of Armed Conflict in Li-
beria, 1989-1996, REV. AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, No. 73, at 355 (1997); Richard
Carver, Liberia: What Hope for Peace? (Online), http://www.-
unicc.org/unhcr/refworldlcountry-/writenet/wrilbr.htm (Oct. 1994); Liberia, 34 U.N.
CHRONICLE, No. 1, at 17-18 (1997); Stephen Riley & Max Sesay, Liberia: After Abuja, REV.
AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, No. 69, at 429 (1996); B. Nowrojee, United Nations and
Regional Peacekeeping - Lessons from Liberia, 8 HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 129 (1995).
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African practice of nonintervention, for it overrode the concepts of sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention in internal affairs
embodied in the OAU Charter.
In the Summer of 1993, the warring factions signed the Cotonou
Agreement. Pursuant to the Agreement the U.N. Observer Mission in
Liberia ("UNOMIL") was created. The Agreement also called for the es-
tablishment of the Liberian National Transitional Government replac-
ing Sawyer's interim government, disarmament of the warring factions,
and the holding of national elections. The Cotonou Agreement failed
soon after it was initiated because,
[c]ontrary to the letter and spirit of the Agreement,
ECOMOG was unable to expand its forces, partly be-
cause many of the African states were unable to fulfil
their pledge to contribute troops for the mission. Worse
still, ECOMOG was substantially downsized because of
financial and domestic political uncertainties in Nigeria
and continuing concerns in Ghana about the seriousness
and good faith of the parties to the Liberian dispute.
236
This was followed by the Akosombo Agreement of 1994, which also
failed, and finally the Abuja Agreement of 1995.237 The Security Coun-
cil, however, continued to extend UNOMIL periodically. Renewed
fighting broke out in April 1996 and after protracted negotiations the
leaders of various factions agreed on a revised version of the Abuja Ac-
cord.238 This led to at least partial disarmament and national elections
in July 1997, with the inauguration in August of Charles Taylor as the
elected President of Liberia.239
3. Appraisal
The Liberian civil war caused widespread devastation and a long
period of suffering in the country. The intervention was a muddled af-
fair, and as to the ECOWAS-U.N. partnership, Professor Adibe provides
an insightful observation:
In Liberia, UNOMIL and ECOMOG maintained parallel
command structures. This is especially surprising be-
cause the U.N. had been invited because of the particu-
lar deficiencies of the regional command structure. The
weakness of U.N. deployments in the field frequently
challenged the relative autonomy of the U.N.'s chain of
236. Clement Adibe, supra note 14, at 479
237. See Stephen Riley & Max Sesay, supra note 235.
238. See Max Sesay, supra note 235, at 405.
239. Karen Lange, In Liberia, The People Choose An Awful Hope for Peace, WASH.
POST, August 10, 1997, at C4; Liberia Inaugurates Taylor as President, WASH. POST,
August 3, 1997, at A22; James Rupert, Election May Signal an End to Liberia's Seven
Years of Upheaval, WASH. POST, July 28, 1997, at A14; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Liberia
Gets a Free Vote, Courtesy of Unfree Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at A9.
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command, thus leaving the ECOWAS command struc-
ture as the only real source of authority to which Libe-
ria's warring factions frequently referred. Conse-
quently, the subordination of regional command
structures to global authority was neither attempted
nor achieved by UNOMIL. For this particular reason,
UNOMIL was essentially redundant in Liberia as a par-
ticipant in the process of conflict resolution.
2 40
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION REVISITED
These five case studies underscore both the increased need for hu-
manitarian intervention and the often striking incapacity of the U.N. or
regional organizations to take appropriate action. After the initial post-
Cold War euphoria dissipated, the probability that the U.N. will not be
able to respond to every humanitarian crisis became clear. Disinterest
among the permanent members and the financial woes of the organiza-
tion mean that many cries for help will go unheeded by the U.N.. Tak-
ing into consideration the increased need for humanitarian intervention
after the end of the Cold War and the diminishing capacity of the U.N.
to meet this need, there must remain some room for action by regional
organizations and individual states.
A. Who May Intervene?
1. The United Nations
Collective humanitarian intervention, when undertaken or
authorized by the U.N., now meets with little controversy. 241 In the
case studies discussed above, the Security Council used its broad Chap-
ter V11 242 powers to authorize military operations, notwithstanding
claims that the matter was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the Member State under article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, that were
actually humanitarian in nature. In the Post-Cold War era, the United
Nations should be able, if not always willing, to act when gross viola-
tions of human rights demand a forceful response. 243
While the legality of humanitarian intervention by the United Na-
240. Clement Adibe, supra note 14, at 484.
241. James A.R. Nafziger, Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power, 22
DENV. J. INT'L & POL'Y 219 (1994); Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian Interven-
tion, 17 MICH J. INT'L L. 323 (1996). However, arguably, there are legal and not just po-
litical limits to the exercise of the enforcement role of the U.N. Security Council. See, e.g.,
Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 285 (1996).
242. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51.
243. Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the U.N. Security Council in Protecting Human
Rights in Crisis Situations: U.N. Humanitarian Intervention in the Post Cold War Era, 3
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (1995).
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tions today enjoys a broad consensus, the U.N.'s capacity to undertake
such operations must be strengthened. This will entail sufficient finan-
cial resources and establishment of a rapid deployment force - a small
force of 3,000 to 5,000 troops under direct U.N. command, supple-
mented by voluntary units designated by states for such operations to
be undertaken by the United Nations. It must, however, be reiterated
that the current situation cannot be ignored - that the U.N.'s ability to
undertake humanitarian intervention is limited by its lack of resources




Regional organizations and arrangements played a significant role
in interventions in three cases studied here-Haiti, Liberia, and the
former Yugoslavia. In Haiti the initiative was taken by the OAS, which
subsequently received endorsement, while in Liberia, a sub-regional or-
ganization, ECOWAS, was responsible for the intervention. In the for-
mer Yugoslavia, it was NATO (with WEU initially undertaking some
functions as well) that implemented the Security Council mandates.
The authorization for regional involvement in enforcement actions
is explicitly stated in the U.N. Charter. Under Article 52,
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence
of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with
such matters relating to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided that such arrangements or agencies
and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.
245
Article 52 further provides that "the Security Council shall, where
appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for en-
forcement action under its authority."246 It also provides, however, that
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or
by regional agencies without the authorization of the security Coun-
cil."24 7 Former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in An
Agenda for Peace, said that regional arrangements "possess a potential
that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report:
preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict
244. Richard Falk characterizes the shift as one from an "initial unfounded enthusi-
asm" to "a more recent unwarranted disillusionment." Richard Falk, The Complexities of
Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 513
(1996).
245. U.N.. CHARTER, art. 52, para. 1.
246. Id. art. 53, para. 1.
247. Id.
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peace-building. 248 Subsequently, in the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda
for Peace, he said that U.N.-regional cooperation could take several
forms, such as consultation, diplomatic and operational support, co-
deployment, and joint operations.
249
During the Cold War era the prevailing climate of mistrust be-
tween the U.S. and the Soviet Union and hence the likelihood of a veto
in the Security Council rendered moot the utilization of regional ar-
rangements for enforcement purposes. But as interventions in Haiti,
Liberia, and the former Yugoslavia illustrate, regional organizations
and arrangements under the supervision of the Security Council can
and should perhaps constitute a most important instrument of collec-
tive intervention.
3. Individual States
Although the right of individual states to carry out humanitarian
intervention came under heavy fire during the Cold War, the U.N.
Charter leaves room for such intervention. Critics interpret Article 2(4)
of the Charter broadly to prohibit any unilateral use of force by
states.250 However, the text of the Charter does not justify such an
overly broad statement. Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force by states
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a member
state, or when such use is otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of
the U.N..251
For humanitarian intervention to be considered valid it is usually
undertaken for a limited purpose and duration; it should not impair the
political independence or territorial integrity of the target state.
252
However, assume that crimes against humanity, especially genocidal
acts, are implicated and unilateral use of force on humanitarian
grounds is aimed at changing the target state's policies or threatening
those responsible for such violations. The goal of prevention or restora-
tion when such violations have occurred might necessitate change in
the structure of authority in the target state. Thus we contend that far
from being inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N., humanitarian
intervention furthers the U.N.'s purposes by protecting human
rights. 25
3
During the Cold War, the right to unilateral humanitarian inter-
248. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, para. 64. U.N. Doc. A147/277,
S/24111, June 17, 1992.
249. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, para. 86, U.N. Doc.
A/50/60, S/1995/1 (1995).]
250. See, e.g., IAN BROWNIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
338-42 (1963); Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
251. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
252. Thus, the Charter prohibition does not apply. Id.
253. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, para. 1, 55 and 56.
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vention assumed special importance because the deadlock in the Secu-
rity Council undermined the U.N.'s ability to respond to humanitarian
crises. 254 As stated earlier, in the post-Cold War era this right is likely
to remain important because of the U.N.'s financial difficulties and the
general lack of enthusiasm among the major powers for new humani-
tarian missions. The U.N. may be unable or unwilling to act,255 and
there may be no regional organization that has the capacity or the will
to intervene. In such cases, individual states should not be prohibited
from doing what international organizations cannot. 25
6
B. Who Should Intervene?
If intervention should be undertaken by the U.N., regional organi-
zations, or individual states, the U.N. Charter does not provide a clear
answer to the question of who should intervene among these actors.
Chapter VIII of the Charter addresses the issue of regional arrange-
ments,257 but the chapter does not specify whether the U.N. or the rele-
vant regional organization should have primary jurisdiction over hu-
manitarian crises.
The relationship of regional organizations to the U.N. is not clearly
and consistently defined within the Charter. For instance, the Charter
prohibits regional organizations from undertaking "enforcement action"
without the consent of the Security Council. 258 On the other hand, the
Charter gives regional organizations priority over the peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes by requiring Member States to "make every effort to
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional ar-
rangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the
Security Council. '"259 Because humanitarian intervention utilizes mili-
tary force, it cannot be considered pacific settlement. Neither is it an
enforcement action, which would be taken against a state committing
an act of aggression against another state.
Clearly, the answer to the question of who should intervene cannot
be found within the text of the Charter, but should be reached bearing
in mind the principles expressed in that text. The United Nations was
founded to take collective measures to ensure international peace and
security. 260 Therefore, the U.N., rather than regional organizations,
254. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help to protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L.
REV. 325 (1967).
255. See Falk, supra note 244.
256. See, e.g., Byron F. Burmester, On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World
Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269 (1994); Steve G.
Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 24 CAL. W.
INT'L L. J. 117 (1993).
257. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 52-54.
258. Id. art. 53, para. 1.
259. Id. art. 52, para. 2.
260. See id. art. 1, para. 1.
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should have primary jurisdiction over intervention in humanitarian cri-
ses. As the most universal and representative international organiza-
tion, the actions of the U.N. enjoy the greatest legitimacy and are least
likely to be motivated by the self-interest of a particular Member State.
If the U.N. explicitly delegates this authority to a regional organi-
zation, is unwilling to act on a crisis brought to its attention, or chooses
not to address the crisis at all, then this authority should pass to the
relevant regional organization if one exists. In some cases, there will be
no relevant regional organization with the capacity, authority, or will-
ingness to act on a humanitarian crisis. In such cases, states that are
willing to intervene to prevent or respond to egregious violations of hu-
man rights should be able to do so. Any such action must, however,
meet the customary international law requirements of necessity and
proportionality. The intervening state must report to the Security
Council the measures taken and must remain accountable for its ac-
tions. In addition, it must also comply with the standards discussed
below.
C. When Should Intervention Take Place?
Any instance of humanitarian intervention must meet the criteria
enunciated in Part I to be considered legitimate. These criteria are ne-
cessity, proportionality, purpose, nature of the actor(s), and maximiza-
tion of the best outcomes. 261 Most of these criteria, such as proportion-
ality and the maximization of the best outcomes, are fact-specific and
can only be applied after the intervention has taken place. Only the ne-
cessity criterion can effectively be applied prior to the actual interven-
tion.
As to its application, the existence of gross, persistent, and system-
atic violations of human rights which are likely to result in massive loss
of life in any country would satisfy the necessity criterion and such
state would be a potential target for intervention.
As we have noted, in the euphoria following the end of the Cold
War the Security Council eagerly created new humanitarian operations
in the glow of its new-found spirit of cooperation. Many of these opera-
tions yielded disappointing results, souring the short-lived enthusiasm
of the U.N. for humanitarian intervention. This waning enthusiasm
indicates the need for additional policy-oriented criteria for determining
when humanitarian intervention would be not only legitimate, but pru-
dent as well.
262
The need to discriminate among potential cases based on the likeli-
hood of success possesses an ethical as well as pragmatic foundation.
261. See Nanda, supra note 3.
262. See Ruth E. Gordon, Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti,
31 TEX INT'L L.J. 43, 56 (1996).
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States owe an overriding duty to defend the lives of their own citizens.
In exceptional situations, such as self-defense or in cases of gross, per-
sistent, and systematic human rights abuses abroad, especially if the
cause involves genocidal acts or crimes against humanity, the state may
determine that the potential outcome justifies risking the lives of its
soldiers. However, to intervene in a situation with minimal prospects
for success frivolously risks the lives of the state's soldiers, thereby
compromising the obligation of the state to protect the lives of its citi-
zens.
Determining the potential for an operation's success is not a scien-
tific process, and some miscalculations will undoubtedly occur. How-
ever, because of their ethical obligations, states, and by extension the
international organizations of which states are members, must en-
deavor to create standards by which potential cases will be evaluated.
Evaluating the chances of success prior to intervening will also mitigate
humanitarian fatigue resulting from unsuccessful operations or indif-
ferent results.
Thus, the capability to marshal the necessary resources to accom-
plish the desired objective, the anticipated timeframe of the interven-
tion, and the strategy for exit are all relevant policy-oriented criteria.
In cases of failed states or situations such as Cambodia under the Pol
Pot regime or the Rwandan genocide, bringing about a change in the
regime might be appropriate if it appears likely that egregious human
rights violations will cease with such change.
V. CONCLUSION
With the persistence of egregious violations of human rights in the
post-Cold War era, humanitarian intervention will remain a fixture in
international law for the foreseeable future. With the return of U.N.
inactivity and incapacity after a brief period of activism, intervention by
regional organizations and individual states will similarly remain an
important part of the international system for the protection of human
rights. Given the number of potential cases and actors, standards for
evaluating the legitimacy of intervention will become more important
than ever.
Taking into consideration limited material rbsources and waning
political will, the U.N., regional organizations, and states must maxi-
mize the results of humanitarian intervention by applying resources
and political will where they will accomplish the desired results.
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VI. POSTSCRIPT
In March 1999, NATO forces launched air strikes against Yugo-
slavia, 263 following unsuccessful attempts to negotiate settlement of the
crisis in Kosovo. The crisis was caused by the Serbian crackdown on
the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA"). The KLA, comprised of ethnic Al-
banians, is seeking secession from Yugoslavia. In a speech explaining
these strikes, President Bill Clinton said:
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in
Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to
prevent a wider war, to diffuse a powder keg at the
heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this
century with catastrophic results. We act to stand
united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are
upholding our values, protecting our interests and ad-
vancing the cause of peace. 2
64
This NATO intervention, purportedly undertaken on humanitarian
grounds-to protect the ethnic Albanian Kosovars-was taken without
the U.N. Security Council's approval. In fact, the Security Council was
paralyzed as two permanent members, Russia and China, were on rec-
ord against the use of force in Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, combating
secession in one of its parts, Kosovo. Thus, the Security Council was
sidelined, although earlier it had adopted resolutions expressing con-
cern over the deteriorating situation in Kosovo.
In light of the charges of ethnic cleansing by the Serb forces in
Kosovo and the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Albania,
Macedonia and Montenegro, with an equally large number displaced
within Kosovo, this crisis presents a powerful case in favor of humani-
tarian intervention. Applying the criteria stated earlier to judge the
validity of such action, it could be argued that once the Security Council
was unable to act, it was appropriate for a regional body to undertake
humanitarian intervention. However, since the Security Council and
the Secretary General were not allowed to play their intended role un-
der the U.N. Charter in the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity, the precedent set by NATO is questionable because it was not
directly authorized by the Security Council nor the Organization for Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe with the approval of the Council. 265
263. See Alexander Nicoll & Guy Dinmore, NATO Forces Bomb Yugoslavia,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at 1, col. 3; Alexander Nicoll, Operation Allied Force
Attacks Serb Targets, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at 2, col. 1.
264. Conflict in the Balkans; In the President's Words: We Act to Prevent a
Wider War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A15, col. 2.
265. On April 10, 1999, the Executive Committee of the World Federation of
the United Nations Associations ("WFUNA"), meeting in Geneva, considered
the situation in Kosovo and, expressing its concern for the suffering of the peo-
ple and the potential dangers of a widening of the conflict, reiterated "the
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United Nations Charter principles on the protection of human rights and the
use of force," and
deplored the paralysis of the United Nations Security
Council which has prevented it from playing its proper
role in gaining the implementation of its earlier resolu-
tions and in responding to developments in Kosovo. It
calls for an end to this paralysis and in particular for the
Security Council and the Secretary-General, each mak-
ing full use of its powers under the Charter, to resume
the search for a peaceful and negotiated solution to the
problem of Kosovo, respecting the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the human rights of its people of all ethnic origins.
In that context the committee noted the step taken on 9
April by the Secretary-General and encouraged him to
continue to give a lead in the search for a solution.
The Committee concluded by underlining "the fact that a solution to the
problem of Kosovo can only be found at the negotiating table. The UN should
be enabled to play a significant and constructive role in reaching and imple-
menting any such solution.
One of the authors of this article, Professor Ved Nanda, serves as the Vice-
Chair of the WFUNA and was one of the drafters of the resolution. A copy of
the text is on file with the Journal.

